TAX SIMPLIFICATION THROUGH
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Complications in the enactment and administration of income tax laws as they
generally exist at present arise very largely from the need to answer four types of
questions: (x) Is it income? (2) Whose income is it? (3)What kind of income is
it? and (4)When is it income? A surprisingly large proportion of the questions that
arise and generate involuted legislation and complicated administrative rulings have
to do with the last two of these questions, questions which essentially have little to
do with the basic philosophy of the income tax, and which fundamentally should be
irrelevant to the assessment of a properly designed income tax.
The question as to the kind of income that an item represents has to do very
largely with the special favors extended to income designated as capital gains. This
is not the place to attempt to answer all of the varied and intricate specious arguments advanced in favor of such special treatment.1 Suffice it here to say that the
one argument that has some semblance of substance in the context of a general
income tax assessed annually at progressive rates, to wit, that gains accumulated over
a long period and realized in a single year may subject the taxpayer to unreasonably
high bracket rates if no allowance is made, is largely vitiated as soon as there is
available an adequate averaging of income, so that the effective rate ultimately depends
not on the income of a single year but on the general level of income over a period
of several years. The difficulty heretofore with such averaging devices has been that
either they were not fully effective in overcoming the disadvantages of "lumpy" income, or they required extensive record keeping, or fairly elaborate computations, or
gave undesirably capricious results in special cases. Cumulative averaging, or perhaps
more descriptively, cumulative assessment, is a method of averaging that is at once
simple, complete, and free from capricious impacts, and its adoption should completely
overcome whatever rational hesitation there may be to the elimination of capital gains
as a special category of income, allowing receipts in this form to be treated on the
same basis as any other.2
The question as to when an item is income is one that in the long run has little
if anything to do with a taxpayer's over-all ability to pay, and in any properly designed
tax should be a matter in which neither the taxpayer nor the Treasury should have
any substantial interest. The fact that under the present law the timing of income
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does so make a substantial difference is amply attested to by the multitude of rules,
distinctions, accounting specifications, and the like that permeate the regulations, and
the amount of contention that arises between taxpayer and Revenue Service over
these matters. That even so the results are not always considered adequately
equitable is evidenced by the fact that at long last limited and complicated forms of
averaging have been introduced to take care of the more extreme cases of inequity.
But what has been done here has hardly scratched the surface of what can be done
through averaging to make the income tax more equitable, and, far from taking
advantage of the potentials for simplification that inhere in averaging, the methods
of averaging adopted have themselves been a source of added and excessive complication.
Cumulative averaging is a method of assessing the income tax on the basis of
the aggregate income of an individual over a period extending from some fixed initial
year to the current year, in such a way that any shifting of items of income or of
deductions from one year to another within this over-all period will have no effect
on the over-all tax burden borne by the individual. Provided only that checks are
provided through a final valuation of assets at the end of the last year of the
averaging period, as at the death of the taxpayer, and the bringing to account of
accruals of income thus revealed, so that income may not be shifted into or out of
the period as a whole, the taxpayer may be left free to carry on his accounting in
any self-consistent way he sees fit, deciding for himself such matters as rates of
depreciation or amortization, whether to expense or capitalize outlays, when to date
transactions, whether to accrue discounts, and the like. More important, taxpayers
will be free to enter transactions at any time without having to take into account
any likelihood that the timing or nominal form of the transactions would have a
significant effect on his ultimate over-all tax liability. Cumulative assessment, coupled
of course with full taxation of capital gains and full deductibility of losses, is thus
a means of freeing the taxpayer completely from the pervasive baleful influence of
the income tax as it exists currently. There will be no lock-ins, no need to cast
transactions in unnatural forms, and no need to consult a tax expert before every
important transaction!
One might think that in order to accomplish all this the assessment of tax on a
cumulative basis would itself have to be fairly complicated. In practice, however,
cumulative assessment turns out to be a very simple computation insofar as the
taxpayer is concerned. By making use of tax tables quite similar to those now used
for the annual tax computation, the computations required of the individual taxpayer
are far simpler, in fact, than those required to take advantage of most of the averaging
provisions that have thus far been enacted. Indeed, these computations turn out to
be so simple that taxpayers in the income classes which now generally itemize
deductions would have no difficulty in applying the cumulative assessment procedure
as a normal routine rather than as an exceptional or optional extra procedure. This
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in itself is an important further simplification in that it removes from the taxpayer
the burden of having to decide whether he should attempt to use the averaging provisions for any particular year.
Conceptually, cumulative assessment amounts to considering all previous payments on account of income tax on income reported for years included in the cumulation period as interest-bearing deposits in a tax guarantee account. The interest at an
appropriate rate credited to this account during the last year plus the net taxable
income from other sources for the current year are then added to the cumulated
taxable income as of the previous year to get the cumulated taxable income for the
period to date. The total tax due on this total income for the period is then obtained
from a tax table appropriate to the number of years covered by the period, in
exactly the same way as a tax is now computed for a single year. The tax currently
due is the amount necessary to bring the balance in the tax guarantee account, including accrued interest, up to the level of this total tax due.
The actual computations required of the taxpayer in a typical case can be set out
as follows for a taxpayer's 1974 return with an averaging period beginning with 1970,
for example:
(i)

Taxable income, 1974

$15,105

(2) Cumulated tax through 1973
(copied from item (6) of 1973 return)
(3) Interest on (2) at 7O/o
(4) Cumulated income through i973
(copied from item (5) of 1973 return)
(5) Cumulated income through i974
(sum of items (1), (3), and ())
(6) Cumulated tax through 1974 on (5)
(computed from tax table for x97o-i975)
(7) Balance of Tax Due
(item (6) less items (2) and ())
TAx

$12,100

847

847
50,010
$65,952

15,345

2,367

TABLE FOR THE PERIOD 1970-1975

If the cumulative income for the period is ... , the tax is
Oe$o..
btntoe.ooo
$30pls3%ftec..e.............sove
.6.
,

Over $6o),ooo but not over $80,000

$13,500 Plus 31% of the excess over $60,000

Over $8oooo but not over $ioo,ooo

$i9,6oo plus 33% of the excess over $8o,ooo

.........................

...............

.......

,.

Two dollar amounts, the cumulative tax and the cumulative income, are carried
forward from the return for the preceding year, as is the year in which the averaging
began. An interest rate is applied to the cumulative tax balance, and this interest
plus the current taxable net income are added to the previous cumulative income
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to get the new cumulative income. The table appropriate to the year in which
averaging began is then entered with this cumulative income to get the cumulative
tax, in exactly the same manner as the tax table for a single year is now used, the
only difference being that the income and tax figures in a table covering five years
will be roughly five times as large as the income and tax figures for a single year,
for the bracket covered by a given tax rate. From the cumulative tax thus obtained
the previous tax balance and the accrued interest for the year are subtracted to get
the tax due.
As compared with a straightforward annual tax computation, this requires five
or six additional lines on the return. The extra computations amount to copying two
dollar amounts and a year, multiplying by an interest rate, two additions and one
subtraction. By way of contrast, the averaging scheme proposed in the 1969 Canadian
proposals for tax reform' would require carrying forward four income items from
four separate returns, four additions (one of five items), two substractions, two table
references (rather than one), three one-digit divisions, and one multiplication by
five. To be sure, such computations would only be carried out in full and be
effective in determining tax in a relatively small number of cases, but for every
case where the complete calculation is made and the tax based on it, there would be
several where a partial calculation is made just to see whether there is an advantage
to be gained from the use of the provision, and even so the taxpayer may be in
somewhat of a quandary as to whether to take immediate advantage of the provisions or wait until a possibly more advantageous moment in the future. The Ministry of Finance suggests that the computations might be performed automatically on
behalf of the taxpayer by a computer, but if this can be done with that formula,
which requires four amounts to be brought forward from preceding years, it would
seem that the cumulative averaging computations could also be performed by a
computer, and more easily, given that less information would need to be carried
forward from prior records. The computations required by the averaging provisions
of the current United States law are even more complicated.
In the original presentation of cumulative averaging it was suggested that the
procedure be specifically an averaging one in that the tables from which the tax
is computed would be such that a taxpayer who happened to have a steady income
of a constant amount each year would pay the same tax whether he figured his tax on
an annual basis or used the cumulative method. While this has much to recommend
it as a simple and unique standard, it is not necessary that this standard be adhered
to in order that the essential quality of the cumulative method be retained, namely
the independence of the tax burden relative to changes in the timing of income.
Since for one reason or another taxpayers will differ in the length of the periods
over which they will be allowed to average, whether from death, migration, marriage,
or other fundamental change in status, strict adherence to a constant income, or even,
' CANADIAN MNISTrY OF FINANCE, PRoPosmxms rOR TAx REFoRm 22-24, 34-35 (1969).
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as has been suggested, an income varying in proportion to the mean per capita income
of the country, might well have a tendency to penalize those with short averaging
periods relative to those eligible for longer averaging periods. This would not only
lead to complaints from those thus disadvantaged, but would have a deterrent
influence over those actions subject to the control of the taxpayer that would have
the effect of terminating the averaging period, such as marriage or separation.
Appropriate adjustment of the tax tables can reduce these effects to a hardly noticeable
level, without any increase in the complexity of the scheme in terms of the actual
computations required of the taxpayer.
This could be done, for example, by computing the tax tables on the basis of
incomes that increase or decrease over time (or both) at rates representing typical
or median degrees of fluctuation of income. For a taxpayer with a typical degree of
fluctuation in his income over the years, it will then make little difference to his overall income tax burden whether his averaging periods are few and long or many and
short. It will still be slightly to the advantage of a taxpayer with an unusually
severely fluctuating income to avoid breaking off his averaging period, and slightly
to the advantage of a taxpayer with an unusually steady income to arrange to have
several shorter averaging periods. Such differentials would be relatively small, however, and in most cases it would be too difficult for a taxpayer to predict his income
over long periods in the future with enough certainty to warrant his attempting to
alter the normal course of events for tax reasons.
It does seem somewhat ironic that one of the main objections raised to the
adoption of cumulative assessment has been the allegation that it is too complicated.
This may in part have been due to the manner in which it was originally presented,
and to its association with other novel or complex methods of taxation such as the
'
proposal for a successions tax based on the transfer of "bequeathing power."
Actually, cumulative assessment, when coupled with full taxation of capital gains,
would prove a master stroke of simplification. Taxpayers could be freed from
nearly all constraints on their bookkeeping; all that would be required would be
for all transactions to be entered in some form, and that omissions and double counting be eschewed. All receipts would be applied either to increase gross income or to
reduce the basis of capital, the choice being at the pleasure of the taxpayer, exception
being allowed only to strictly limited classes of receipts deemed to be exempt, such
as gifts and bequests, and (but hopefully not for long) tax exempt interest. All
outlays not construable as personal consumption outlays or noncharitable gifts may
similarly be applied either as deductions from gross income or as increases in the
basis of capital assets, likewise at the complete discretion of the taxpayer. The only
ultimate constraint would be that the taxpayer not be allowed to write his assets
down to a negative or nominal net equity, allowing for any hypothecation of the
assets.
I W.
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It may at first seem odd that a taxpayer should be permitted to write off his
investments as rapidly as he pleases, especially as this treatment can, under present
law, be considered the equivalent of exempting from income tax an amount equal
to the normal rate of profits on the value thus written off. Here, however, owing to
the fact that the interest factor is explicitly taken into account by allowing interest
to be accumulated on early tax payments, postponement of tax by early write-off
amounts simply to borrowing from the government at the stipulated interest rate.
Provided that the rate of interest is maintained in suitable relation to market rates
of interest, the taxpayer merely borrows from the government through tax deferment
rather than from private lenders; the liquidity of the taxpayer may be enhanced,
but his ultimate tax burden is not reduced.
For example, if under the present law a taxpayer subject to a thirty per cent
marginal rate manages to postpone $io,ooo of income for one year, say by arranging
a sale on January 2 instead of December 3, his tax bill for the earlier year will then
be reduced by $3,000. If he invests this $3,000 for one year at say eight per cent, he
will realize $3,240. He will, with respect to the second year, have to pay a tax at
thirty per cent not only on the $xooo of income postponed, but on the $240 of
interest earned, or a tax of $3,o72, but even so he will wind up $i68 better off. Under
cumulative assessment, on the other hand, paying the $3,000 tax in the earlier year
increases the balance in the tax guarantee account by $3,0o0, and if eight per cent
is used as the rate of interest credited to this account, equivalent to what could be
earned on the outside, the $240 credited to this account and included in cumulated
income just balances the $240 that the taxpayer could have earned by postponing tax
and investing the amount himself. The cumulative income at the end of the later
year is the same in either case, as is also therefore the cumulative tax. The tax
payment in the second year will be $3,240 lower in the second year if the $3,ooo were
paid in the earlier year than if it were not, as a result of the balance in the tax
guarantee account being $3,240 higher, and the taxpayer will wind up equally well
off in either case. Investment in early tax payments is made just as profitable as
outside investment of funds obtained by deferring taxes, for such a case.
Of course, if the taxpayer has opportunities for investment that yield a higher
return than the rate of interest currently being credited on the tax guarantee account,
he will be able to gain from postponing his taxes. But this gain is essentially no
different from the gain he could realize by borrowing from any other source at the
given rate of interest. The only effect of cumulative averaging is to offer a new
source of borrowed funds, which may provide an improvement in the liquidity
position of the taxpayer. To the extent that this takes place, it may well be considered a desirable improvement in the efficiency of the over-all capital market.
However, the enhancement of liquidity provided by cumulative averaging is likely
to prove considerably less substantial than might appear on the surface; a taxpayer
who shows a potential lender a ledger with assets written down for tax purposes
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may expect his line of credit to be somewhat shorter than if his books showed the
full value. Even if the lender is fully aware of the market values and is prepared
to rely on them, he will have to take into consideration the potential liability for the
deferred taxes. Therefore, borrowing by tax deferral may, to a considerable extent,
be at the expense of ability to borrow from other sources.
The main reason for limiting the write-down of assets for tax purposes would
be the avoidance of a situation where the government would find itself unable to
collect the tax ultimately due on the liquidation of the assets. For the bulk of
responsible taxpayers this should not present any problem; any realization in excess
of book value would itself provide the funds for the payment of the tax on the
capital gain thus revealed. Unless a taxpayer has actually concealed his assets and
liabilities, even bankruptcy would represent no problem. A taxpayer with no net
worth would have no tax due beyond what he presumably has already paid with
respect to income realized and spent on personal consumption. The chief remaining
danger would be that the taxpayer might, having written down his assets to a
nominal figure, suddenly exchange them for cash or foreign assets and abscond
from the jurisdiction. Presumably the appropriate way to deal with this would be
through the use of the jeopardy assessment procedures of Chapter 70 of the Internal
Revenue Code. While unlimited early write-off might increase the gain to the
taxpayer from such absconding, and thus possibly increase the risk of revenue loss,
the unusually heavy use by the taxpayer of such a write-off might in turn serve as
a flag to alert revenue agents of the possibility of such absconding.
Although cumulative averaging was originally thought of as simply an elegant and
precise way of achieving the equity which is the main raison d'tre of most averaging
proposals, it has become increasingly clear that the principal and unique achievement
offered by cumulative averaging lies in the drastic simplification of the tax law
and regulations which it makes possible, in conjunction, of course, with the full
taxation of capital gains on the same basis as other income. Even the most complete
averaging of income, while of course making substantial differences in extreme cases,
makes surprisingly little difference in the way the income tax burden is distributed
in practice and while it may be considered desirable or even essential to provide
exceptional relief for these exceptional cases, the magnitude of the problem relative
to the over-all yield of the tax may seem too small to warrant going to a reform as
far-reaching as cumulative assessment. When, however, cumulative assessment is
looked at as a means of simplifying the law and drastically reducing if not eliminating
altogether the impact of technical tax considerations on the conduct of business and
economic activity of all kinds, the minor complexities of cumulative averaging
become a minute price to pay, and the adoption of cumulative averaging, far from
being an added complication, emerges as a master stroke of simplification.
It is, indeed, instructive to go systematically through the Internal Revenue Code
to see what sections could be deleted with the introduction of such a cumulative
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TABLE I
PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND REGULATIONS THAT COULD
BE DELETED WIm CUmuLATrvE ASSESSMENT

Approximate Number of Pages

Subject

Section
77
79
80
81
83

108
109
111
121
167
168
169
171
172
173
174
175
177
178
179
180
182
184
185
187
248
263
264
266
268
272
273
278
281
301-07
331-95
401-25
441-83
531-37
541-47
611-17
1001-91
1201-45

Regulations
Code as
as of
Amended to
August 19697
19706
0.3
1.0
0.8
0.3

xx
7.5
xx
xx

0.8
0.1
1.0
xx
1.5
2.6

2.5
1.0
0.1
1.0
1.7
8.0
4.3

xx
2.3
0.5
2.8
4.0
26.5
6.0

2.5
2.0
2.7
0.4

2.5
2.0
10.0
0.3

7.7
5.2
25.0
0.9

1.3
1.2
xX
xx
xx
xx
xx
xx
Xx
,x
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
xx
xx
11.0

1.3
2.0
0.8
1.1
1.8
0.6
1.2
2.2
1.2
1.2
0.5
1.4
1.0
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.4
2.2
14.0

5.5
3.5
1.5
4.9
6.1
0.7
3.9
xx
xx
xX
1.1
xx
4.4
2.0
0.2
1.5
xX
Xxc
xx
21.5

31.7
13.2
13.4
3.3
10.8
7.1
24.7
13.2

44.1
42.5
31.0
6.0
21.0
24.0
31.8
54.0

162.0
150.0
160.0
8.5
26.0
90.0
108.0
76.0

146.1

322.2

942.0

Commodity Credit Loans
Group Term Insurance
Securities Previously Written Off
Suspense Accounts
Property Transferred in Conjunction with
Services
Discharge of Indebtedness
Improvements to Property by Lessee
Recovery of Bad Debts, etc.
Sale of Residence by Taxpayer over 65
Depreciation
Amortization of Emergency Facilities
Amortization of Grain Storage/Pollution
Control
Amortization of Bond Premiums
Net Operating Loss Carryback, Carryover
Circulation Promotion Expenses
Expenditures for Research and
Experimentation
Soil and Water Conservation Expenditures
Trademark and Copyright Expenditures
Amortization of Improvements by Lessee
Additional First Year Depreciation
Fertilizer Expenditures
Land Clearing Expenditures
Amortization of Rolling Stock
Amortization of Grading and Tunnel Bores
Coal Mine Safety Equipment
Amortization of Organizational Expenses
Non-deductibility of Capital Expenditures
Life Insurance Premiums on Employees Lives
Capitalization of Taxes and Carrying Charges
Sale of Land with Unharvested Crop
Disposal of Coal Property
Non-amortization of Testamentary Annuities
Development Expenses of Citrus Groves
Income of Terminal Railroads
Distributions to Shareholders
Stockholders Treatment in Liquidation and
Reorganization
Deferred Compensation
Accounting Methods
Improper Accumulation of Surplus
Personal Holding Companies
Depletion
Gain and Loss
Capital Gain and Loss

0.2
xx
xx

Total
Sources:
' CCH INT.

'CCH

1954 5
Code

XX
XX

REv. CODE OF 1954 (1954).
INCOmE, EsTAT, AND GIFT TAx PROvIsIONs, INTERNAL REvENuE CODE-INCLUDING I969

AfENDIENTS (I970).

' CCH INCOriE TAX REGs.AS OF AUG. I, 1969 (1969).
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TABLE 2
PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND REGULATIONS THAT COULD
BE SUBSTANTIALLY

SHORTENED WITH CUMULATIVE ASSESSMENT

Approximate Number of Pages
Code as

Section
37
56
72
101
101-05
122
165
166
170

Subchapter
JJ
K

L
M
Q
R

Subject
Retirement Income
Tax Preference Tax
Annuities
Death Benefits
Accident Compensation and Insurance
Reduced Retirement Pay Options
Losses
Bad Debts
Charitable Contributions (in Property)

Estates and Trusts
Partnerships

Insurance
Investment Trusts
Miscellaneous Adjustments Between Years
Taxation of Partnerships as Corporations

1954
Code

Regulations

Amended to
As of
1970
August 19069

1.3
xX
4.0
2.2
1.5
Mx
1.2
1.0
0.3

3.0
8.5
9.0
3.0
2.2
0.5
3.0
2.5
6.9

7.8
xx
72.0
17.5
17.0
%x
13.0
5.7
26.7

11.3

38.6

159.7

24.0
15.3

32.0
17.0

106.0
58.0

12.5
6.7

67.0
15.0

158.0
29.0

15.5
xx

12.1
4.5

40.0
13.0

58.5

135.5

314.0

69.8

174.1

473.7

Sources: Same as Table i.

assessment basis. A somewhat hastily compiled list appears in Table I. In addi-

tion to the sections listed in Table i that could be almost totally eliminated, there are
a number of other sections which would be drastically shortened or simplified if
the appropriate changes were made to accommodate cumulative assessment. Table
2 lists the more salient cases of this sort. As the entire Chapter I of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 runs to 355 pages, it will be seen that cumulative assessment,

even if it only eliminates half of the 69.8 pages in the second category, results in
cutting the code in half, even allowing for fairly substantial amounts of new material
necessary to fully implement cumulative assessment.
In many cases, to be sure, it may be too much to expect that the specific provisions would be immediately removed from the statute books. Even if the complicated provisions are not repealed outright, however, cumulative assessment would
in most cases leave both the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service with little

incentive to dispute questionable points, and even more important, would enable
the taxpayers to make decisions without having to consider the tax consequences
(except, of course, to the extent that their effects on the liquidity of the taxpayer
might be important, rather than their long run effects).
In some cases, as with the depletion provisions, their repeal would represent a
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removal of a discrimination which, however much it may have been deplored by
tax analysts, has mustered strong support from the allies of those standing to
benefit. Cumulative averaging would allow most of these special deductions to be
continued, at least for those for whom the deduction would not involve a reduction
of basis to below zero, while at the same time bringing closer the possibility that the
inequity inherent in these deductions as they operate at present could be eliminated
by ultimately bringing net returns in excess of outlays into account for income
tax purposes. It would be ironic, for example, to permit ordinary investors to write
off their investments at whatever rate they please but to deny this privilege to oil
investors, while on the other hand it would be somewhat more obviously inequitable
to allow specifically for depletable resources to be written down to a negative value
without any defined limit. Cumulative assessment is thus not only an important
reform in its own right, but also facilitates other reforms. It is, indeed, an
essential keystone of any thoroughgoing reform of the income tax structure, without
which the structure remains a patchwork congeries of incompletely integrated provisions.
If cumulative assessment can do so much for so little, one may well ask why has
it not been universally acclaimed and adopted in the thirty years since it was first
proposed? Inertia is obviously a large part of the answer, but not all. Part of the
answer is a failure on the part of its proponents to realize the salient importance of
the simplification aspects of the proposal as distinguished from its equity aspects.
But much of the neglect stems from the persistent notion that cumulative assessment is complicated. Administrative complexity was indeed cited as one of the
reasons for rejecting the scheme by the Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation
in I966. Yet the Commission eventually recommended an averaging provision that
is much more complicated than cumulative assessment in terms of the volume of
records required to be maintained and the number of computations required, and
which largely fails to provide the potential for simplification in other directions that
cumulative assessment offers.
It must be admitted that there are complications involved in cumulative assessment that relate to changes in marital or jurisdictional status of the taxpayer, complications that are particularly important in Canada where the number of taxpayers
changing their residence from Canada to the United States or other foreign countries
or vice versa relative to the total number of domestic taxpayers is larger than in the
United States and most other countries relying heavily on the income tax. Canada
would, for this reason, be in a relatively poor position to be the first to experiment
with this innovation. Yet even so, the problems would seem to be surmountable
with difficulties that would be minor relative to the advantages to be gained.
The problem of change in marital status, which is a more nearly universal problem,
can be resolved in a number of ways, none of which are entirely without drawr3 REPORT or THE ROYAL CoMMISSION oN TAXATION 257, 281 (1966).
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backs, but among which should be found one or two reasonably satisfactory ones. The
straightforward procedure, that of determining a separate income for each individual
from, say, his majority through death, without interruptions for change of marital
status, would involve detailed accounting for transactions between husband and wife,
including, in principle, separation of imputed income from the use of consumer
durables. Even were this feasible, this seems an unattractive alternative. Another
possibility is to break the averaging period at time of change of marital status, involving a valuation of assets and a bringing to account of all unrealized capital
gains at that time. This need not involve a heavy tax liability at that point; provision
could be made for offsetting the gains thus brought to account for the period
preceding the change in status against the writing down of assets in the accounts for
the initial period subsequent to the change of status. Nor would there necessarily be
any penalty attached to the interruption of the averaging period other than the
additional reporting and calculation required. As indicated above, the tax tables
may be drawn up so as to produce equality, on the average, between taxpayers with
short and with long averaging periods. A third and perhaps the most satisfactory
alternative is to carry the averaging period for each individual through changes in
marital status with splitting of income accrued during marriage. This likewise would
require a valuation of assets at the time of change of status, to prevent nominal
accounting changes or transaction formalities from producing shifts of income from
one partner to the other, but again in most cases the amount at stake in these valuations in terms of long run over-all tax burden would tend to be relatively small and
the ultimate direction of the net effect frequently uncertain, so that pressures to
distort this valuation in one direction or the other for tax reasons would be minimal.
The important valuation for determining over-all ultimate tax burdens would be
the final valuation at death, but in this case the valuation must be made fairly
carefully for estate and death duties in any event.
Dealing with changes in residence or citizenship status is a somewhat more
difficult problem. Once-in-a-lifetime changes can of course be appropriately dealt
with by terminating the averaging period with a valuation of assets and assessment of
accrued gains and losses. While this will mean that fairly substantial tax differentials
may in some cases hinge on the timing of the change in status, it is in this case
somewhat doubtful whether one would want to preserve tax neutrality towards
changes of residence or citizenship even if that could be done. Tours of duty
abroad and similar situations will require somewhat more complicated procedures
to work out an equitable formula, presumably on the basis of retaining fully in
the tax base all unearned income and making some adjustment for earnings, expenditures, and taxes abroad. The corresponding provisions in existing laws are at least
as arbitrary and no less complex in their application. Indeed, even though cumulative assessement may be conceptually rather complex under these circumstances, it
seems likely that here too the actual application of the rules can be made basically

CUMULATIVE AVERAGING

simpler and less discriminatory than the existing provisions. In any case it would
be virtually hopeless for any one jurisdiction to attempt to preserve tax neutrality in
such cases independently of what other jurisdictions might do. Thus even here
the charge of complexity seems on examination to be without real substance. Novelty,
yes, and abstruseness of concept, possibly, but practical complexity, no.
Another element in the resistance to cumulative assessment as a solution for the
manifold ailments of the income tax is a somewhat loosely articulated philosophical
feeling that a lifetime of income is too much to consider as a unit for tax assessment,
-and that even periods of fifteen or thirty years would be really too long.6 There may
be, indeed, a sense in which a man in his fifties is a different person from the same
man in his twenties, but it is not at all clear whether this would argue for a lesser
or for a greater concession with respect to fluctuations in income than would be
granted by long-term averaging. Arguments based on maximizing aggregate utility
might argue in one direction and those based on concepts of equity, fairness, or
egalitarianism might argue in the other.
Consider, for example, a comparison between C who because of family connections
or otherwise steps into a $30,000 job immediately after graduation, and holds that
constant level throughout his career, and G who starts off at say $0,ooo and by
dint of application and energy gradually rises through the ranks to a top of $50,000
near the end of his career, both having the same "lifetime" income. In terms of
because of his inability to borrow against his future earnings he has to skimp on
his standard of living in his early years in a way that he considers less satisfactory
than that which he would have chosen had he been free to borrow and reallocate his
expenditure. To impose a higher tax burden on him would seem to be adding insult
to injury. Yet a utilitarian, arguing on the basis of maximizing aggregate utility,
could claim that the heavier taxation of G in the later years would cut into a relatively
more frivolous and luxurious level of consumption than would additional taxation
of C, and that, therefore, the heavier rate on G's later income than on C's income
would be needed to maximize total utility, consumption patterns in previous years
being "bygones." Even this argument, however, would hardly justify levying as
high a rate on G's later years as would be levied on the income of an individual W
whose income has been steadily at the $5o,oo level, given that W will probably have
a considerably higher level of accumulated consumer durables to enjoy than would
G. Moreover G, in the process of adapting his life-style to his progressively increasing resources, will probably have been to some considerable additional expense
in disposing of his early less luxurious items and acquiring progressively better
ones, and in moving from more modest to more sumptuous quarters, so that for
this reason too his current status is substantially inferior to that of W, even if one
considers him to be in effect an entirely new person with no recollection of his
could see no justification for using a lifetime, or the lengthy periods described above, as
'"[Wie
the interval over which income shoud be averaged." Id. at 257.
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previous incarnation. Yet most averaging provisions as currently applied will give
no relief whatever to G relative to W, and even if a five- or ten-year averaging

scheme were applied entirely without the threshold provisions that typically deny
application of averaging except in cases of large excesses of current income over an
average of the incomes of the recent past, the benefit of such averaging would be
minute.
Other appealing cases are those of the writer of a best-seller, and of the athletic
star, where a period of very high earning power is followed by much more modest
levels of income. In such cases, where the individual not only anticipates the later
lower levels of income but himself provides for this period by saving relatively large
amounts out of his high earnings period, the utilitarian rationale for higher taxation
does not apply, and it is particularly hard to defend the "separate incarnation" concept
when the younger self is observed to provide specifically for the older self.
The "separate incarnation" theory seems particularly weak when it is used to
defend the status quo in that the current tax law contains many provisions that result
in current tax liability depending on transactions which may have taken place many
decades previously, indeed in some cases before the birth of the taxpayer, as when
he is asked to pay a capital gains tax on property handed down by gift over
several generations. To be sure, some of these long-term effects are incidental
effects of provisions enacted without concern as to the time-span over which they
would operate, as with the capital gains provisions involved in the above case. But
in other cases the time-span is quite deliberate, as with the provisions relating to
pension plans and deferred compensation generally. And it is indeed ludicrous
to see the rather pusillanimous provisions of sections 1301 and 13o2 regarding lumpsum payments of income in relation to efforts spanning several years being altogether
ignored in favor of the far juicier possibilities involved in the conversion of such
income into "capital gains" by various contractual antics. At best, indeed, the
"separate incarnation" concept is hard to square with current tax provisions, and
it would be hard to justify on such a basis the restriction of averaging to as
short a period as five years, as seems to be the general practice at present. And if
one were to attempt to meet this objection to the five year period head-on by allowing ten or fifteen years, the added administrative and computational burden would
make the comparative simplicity of cumulative assessment seem even more attractive.
Still another apprehension with respect to universal averaging in general, the
contagion of which has spread unwarrantedly to cumulative averaging, is that it
might interfere in some way with fiscal policy. Ordinary averaging devices indeed
often introduce a time lag element in the relation between income and tax payments,
reducing the "built-in flexibility" of the tax by damping somewhat the tendency of
the tax yield to increase during boom years more than in proportion to the increase
in incomes. In the case of some of the compulsory schemes, there is even a tendency
to produce larger tax payments in lean years than would be payable on a straight
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annual basis. Cumulative averaging, however, counters this lag with a fairly strong
enhancement of countercyclical effects on the downswing, when tax abatement and
even refunds will tend to occur as income is in effect brought forward from brackets
previously taxed at high rates and the tax previously paid on this income is credited
against a new tax computed at lower bracket rates. Moreover, by eliminating the
inequities now associated with the sudden changes in annual rates that would
often be called for to implement fully a strong fiscal policy, as some taxpayers are
caught with high income realization in high rate years while others are fortunate
or perspicacious enough to have more of their income fall in the relatively low rate
years, cumulative averaging removes a significant deterrent to vigorous fiscal policy.
Cumulative averaging also adds a new instrument of macroeconomic policy in the
possibility of changing the interest rate which will be applied in bringing forward
the cumulative present value of past tax payments. Far from interfering with fiscal
policy, cumulative averaging facilitates and enhances it.
Yet in spite of the weakness of these more respectable arguments against the
adoption of cumulative assessment, the practical obstacles to its adoption remain
formidable, at least in the United States. In a subtle way, cumulative averaging
represents a threat to powerfully entrenched forces. To many legislators, power to
trade and manipulate the intricate clauses by which favors are granted to or withheld from special groups is one of the essentials of political maneuvering that would
be severely constrained by tax simplification. To lawyers and accountants who are
especially influential in the drafting of legislation, their knowledge of the intricacy
of the law is an investment that they would be reluctant to see become obsolete by
major simplification, and the drafting of new intricacies is the perverse expression of
the exercise of a skill in which they take considerable pride, though this pride is
increasingly tinged with apprehension at the seemingly uncontrollable growth of
the Frankenstein's monster they have nurtured. And to the many groups of taxpayers that benefit from one special provision or another, simplification threatens
their privileged position. Even were one to offer a reduction in the top bracket
rates as an offset to the elimination of these various loopholes, and even if this
could be done in such a way that few if any would be worse off as a result of the
bargain, many loophole users might well hesitate to accept the bargain, preferring
the known evil of high rates tempered by long-established loopholes to the possibility that once having lost their loophole in a trade for lower rates, a subsequent
legislature, not being bound to the terms of the bargain, might again raise the rates.
Yet even in face of these rather formidable obstacles, it seems possible that if the
average business man were clearly presented with the prospect of a tax under which
he would be able to keep his accounts in any consistent way he sees fit, and to shape
his transactions in any way that suits his business purposes without having to
consider tax consequences at every turn, and without having to fear that a competitor
will be able to take unfair advantage because of the tax law, or that his company
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will be raided for the sake of special tax positions, a fair amount of support for
fundamental tax reform could be generated. Without cumulative assessment, the
prospects for generating such support will be slight, and the experience with the
1969 tax reforms suggests that piecemeal attempts at reform or simplification, how-

ever well intentioned, may be converted by the legislative processes and the operations of the conference committee into new and more baffling intricacies.7 Cumulative assessment seems indeed the essential key to effective simplification.
' See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172 (Dec. 30, 1969).

